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Reconsidering Anonymization-Related Concepts
and the Term ‘‘Identification’’ Against the Backdrop
of the European Legal Framework
Murat Sariyar1,2 and Irene Schlünder2
Sharing data in biomedical contexts has become increasingly relevant, but privacy concerns set constraints for free
sharing of individual-level data. Data protection law protects only data relating to an identifiable individual, whereas
‘‘anonymous’’ data are free to be used by everybody. Usage of many terms related to anonymization is often not
consistent among different domains such as statistics and law. The crucial term ‘‘identification’’ seems especially hard to
define, since its definition presupposes the existence of identifying characteristics, leading to some circularity. In this
article, we present a discussion of important terms based on a legal perspective that it is outlined before we present issues
related to the usage of terms such as unique ‘‘identifiers,’’ ‘‘quasi-identifiers,’’ and ‘‘sensitive attributes.’’ Based on these
terms, we have tried to circumvent a circular definition for the term ‘‘identification’’ by making two decisions: first,
deciding which (natural) identifier should stand for the individual; second, deciding how to recognize the individual. In
addition, we provide an overview of anonymization techniques/methods for preventing re-identification. The discussion
of basic notions related to anonymization shows that there is some work to be done in order to achieve a mutual
understanding between legal and technical experts concerning some of these notions. Using a dialectical definition
process in order to merge technical and legal perspectiveson terms seems important for enhancing mutual understanding.
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Introduction
Making research data available to the scientificcommunity for future research purposes is often pos-
tulated and required by funding policies, where public funds
are involved.1–3 Sharing data has many benefits, for example,
ensuring the validation of results, receiving feedback to im-
prove data quality for ongoing data collection efforts, and fa-
cilitating innovative secondary analyses and meta-analyses on
the original data.4,5 Even though the research community
widely acknowledges the necessity and usefulness of making
data collections available for use within new and different
contexts, there are two main issues regarding such secondary
use. First, there is a legitimate interest of researchers collecting
data and harvesting it to such a degree that their efforts seem
worthwhile. Second, privacy concerns raise legal issues, since
the data of patients and donors are at stake, and these data are
very often sensitive data. We will deal here with this second
key barrier for sharing research data in Europe.
The secondary use of data relating to individuals is allowed
under most legislations if corresponding consent is available
or the national law provides for special permissions to use the
data or the data are anonymized.6 Anonymization makes data
sharable without further data protection constraints such as
consent management, which produces an additional, some-
times significant, administrative burden, and which individual
researchers or research groups may not be able or have the
resources to take on. This is one of the main reasons why
different scientific communities (e.g., the database commu-
nity, the statistical disclosure community, and the crypto-
graphy community) are developing techniques and methods
for anonymization.7–13
However, anonymization can have a negative impact on
the use of the data for the research community. Distortions
caused by anonymization techniques should therefore not be
accepted as a prerequisite to make data sharable. On the
contrary, application of anonymization must be justified by
well-established rules that serve a public interest. The
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privacy of patients and donors whose data are processed
certainly is such a public interest as well as a fundamental
right of the respective individuals (e.g., Article 8 European
Charter of Fundamental Rights). Data protection law gives
substance to this fundamental right and at the same time
provides rules for the trade-off with research interests.
We deal here with notions related to identity disclosure risks
and especially with the question of what identification could
mean concretely from a legal perspective. Some anonymiza-
tion techniques/methods for preventing reidentification are
provided as well.
Background: Legal Framework and Reasons
for Anonymization
Anonymization within the legal data protection
framework in the EU
Legal constraints for data sharing result from the legally
protected interest of information privacy, that is, the ‘‘right
to select what personal information about me is known to
what people.’’14 Thus, data protection law protects only data
relating to an identifiable individual, whereas ‘‘anonymous’’
data are free to be used by everybody. This general principle
is recognized worldwide, nevertheless data protection law
details differ from state to state and the same is true for the
legal concepts of anonymity. Thus, it seems to be useful to
refer to a concrete legal data protection framework to pave
the way in the jungle of terms, notions, and concepts.
According to Article 2(a) of the basic legal framework in
Europe, the EU Data Protection Directive of 1995,15 per-
sonal data are ‘‘any information related to a natural person,
who is identified or identifiable directly or indirectly in
particular by reference to an identification number or to one
or more factors specific to his physical, physiological,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity.’’ Recital 26
makes clear that ‘‘the principles of protection shall not apply
to data rendered anonymous.’’ Thus, anonymization is a
means to make data available without further legal con-
straints, at least with respect to data protection law.
Although there is no definition of anonymity in the Direc-
tive, the term can be deduced from the term ‘‘personal data,’’
being the opposite term to ‘‘anonymous data.’’ According to
Recital 26: ‘‘to determine, whether a person is identifiable,
account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be
used either by the controller or by any other person to identify
the said person.’’ This provision takes account of the fact that
absolute anonymity is not achievable, that is, that there will
hardly ever be a zero risk of reidentification.16 Therefore, it is
widely accepted that de facto anonymity is sufficient and this
approach is also pursued by the Article 29 Working Party—
being the European body for giving advice on the interpretation
of the data protection directive—as many statements indicate.17
The term de facto anonymity also implies that anonymity
is not static: the same information (data set or data record)
can be anonymous in one context and personal data in another.
The full name (e.g., ‘‘Harry Smith’’) might not be an identifier
without additional information in an epidemiological database,
whereas it is sufficient to be identified in a classroom. In
technical terms, this is described as the fact that the full name
is not structurally unique, but might only be empirically un-
ique.18 In the latter case, reference information available to
those who have access to the data plays a decisive role in the
decision on whether data are identifiable. Therefore, a dei-
dentified data set available to anybody on the Internet should
be more protected than the same data set stored on a university
server accessible only to a few researchers. This leads to the
question whether access policies as additional safeguards can
have an impact on the status of anonymity.
Second, whether means are likely reasonably to be used
also depend on the motives of an attacker to reidentify a
person from a deidentified data set. Data relating to people
of public interest require a higher level of protection, and
sensitive data require an even higher level. Therefore, the
level of deidentification has to be defined accordingly.
Last but not least, the invasion of privacy, which has to be
taken into account while assessing the risk of reidentifica-
tion, depends on the type of information disclosed. For ex-
ample, the reidentification of a spectacle wearer in a data set
in which spectacles purchased from an optician are listed is
a disclosure of personal data, for which the invasion of
privacy would be quite low. In contrast, the reidentification
of an HIV patient could have much more impact on the
person’s life, be it his family life, working environment, etc.
The concept of anonymization will not change under the
General Data Protection Regulation, which is going to replace
the current Directive. The definition of personal data given in
Article 4 para 1 of the latest version (see result of the Trilogue:
www.statewatch.org/news/2015/dec/eu-council-dp-reg-draft-
final-compromise-15039-15.pdf) does not substantially differ
from that in the Directive. In addition, there is no indication
that the concept of anonymization or its impact on the pos-
sibility of data sharing has been changed.
Anonymous data under EU law must be distinguished from
pseudonymized data, also known as coded-anonymized. In the
latter case, artificial identifiers (pseudonyms) replace the most
identifying fields. Although there are many advantages in using
pseudonymized data instead of anonymized data, even from the
perspective of patients and donors, such as the possibility to get
feedback regarding research results, pseudonymized data re-
main legally protected personal data, at least for all who can
retrace the individual, for example, for follow-ups. This article
only deals with full (de facto) anonymity, which does not allow
the provision of feedback or to have follow-ups. It is an unre-
solved question whether pseudonymized data can be consid-
ered anonymous for those who have no access to the key (see
the decision of the German Federal Court of Justice, which has
presented this question to the European Court of Justice: http://
dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Gericht=BGH&
Datum=31.12.2222&Aktenzeichen=VI%20ZR%20135/13).
The term ‘‘anonymization’’ is not identical to ‘‘deidenti-
fication.’’ Deidentification is the removal of attributes known
to increase the risk of identification, and this can be seen as a
preliminary step for producing anonymous data.19,20 It re-
quires, however, a further assessment as to whether the dei-
dentification process achieves anonymization. Equally, the
well-known HIPAA list of identifiers in health data, which
have to be removed under U.S. law before sharing the data
according to the HIPAA Act, leads only to deidentification,
not to anonymous data in the sense of data protection law in
Europe.
Balancing privacy and usefulness of the data
The first main goal of anonymization methods is the
transformation of data to be released in such a way that it
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does not exhibit information of individuals that was not
previously known (data protection)10,13; the second one is
the preservation of as much of the underlying information as
possible (usefulness).
The technical approach is to balance the two goals by
defining the desired end result21: a minimal anonymous data
set satisfies a given privacy requirement by applying a set of
anonymization operations that cannot be reduced without
violating the requirement (just focusing on the number of
steps, irrespective of how useful the data might be according
to some utility metric). In contrast, an optimal anonymous
data set satisfies the given privacy requirement and contains
the highest amount of information among all privacy-
satisfying data sets according to a chosen utility metric (e.g.,
instead of perturbing one important variable, two rather
unimportant variables are perturbed). Utility metrics are
necessary for assessing the usefulness of the data. For un-
defined data usages, general-purpose metrics such as the
information entropy22 and coverage of the original domain
attributes23 can be used. If the use cases are specified
concretely, special-purpose metrics can be used, for ex-
ample, for assessing the usefulness of the data for a clas-
sification task with methods such as logistic regression,
association rules, or classification trees. Here, results on
the original and the modified data are compared (errors
made, variance, etc.).
Although it seems rather easy to define the general goal
of anonymization from a technical perspective, it is far
more difficult to decide a given case from a legal per-
spective, for example, to what extent has an electronic
health record of patients to be deidentified to share the data
within a certain research project? Would the situation
change if the data are included in a database for future
research purposes? Can genetic data be kept in? How is the
situation to be assessed if the database integrates patient
data from other sources? Whereas anonymization methods
often start from the assumption of a static result, that is,
after the anonymization process is anonymous or not, the
legal view is different: a risk assessment has to be made for
every single situation. The trade-off between data protec-
tion on the one hand and usability of the data for the re-
spective research purpose on the other hand has to be made
again as soon as the situation has changed. Those changes
can have very different reasons: reidentification techniques
have been enhanced over time, the data have been enriched
by integrating other sources, some of the patients involved
have become of interest for the public or potential at-
tackers, reference information has increased, etc. The latter
can, for example, be observed regarding genetic informa-
tion and biosamples.
The concrete assessment of the usefulness of data from a
legal perspective is frequently only possible through guid-
ance by a group of experts. One has to rely on statisticians or
other data analysts in their judgment regarding the useful-
ness of data.
Disclosure risks
In the method-oriented literature, three main types of
identity disclosure risks are discussed: identity, attribute,
and membership disclosure.24 Identity disclosure is usually
regarded as the singling out of an individual within a data
set, which means that all information contained in the data
set about this individual is revealed. Attribute disclosure is
the unveiling of sensitive information of an individual, e.g.,
having a specific disease, without performing a singling out.
For example, the individual can be linked to a set of rows
with a common value for the sensitive attribute (see the
short discussion on Table 2). Finally, membership disclosure
means that an attacker is able to determine whether an in-
dividual is contained in a data set. In contrast to attribute
disclosure, the attacker only knows that a specific individual
is in the data set without the ability to deduce the concrete
values of sensitive attributes. All these disclosure types
necessitate slightly different forms for measuring risks. For
example, for assessing the reidentification risk, the popula-
tion uniqueness is frequently used, which can be estimated
by the proportion of records that are unique in the original
data set/population.25
Irrespective of the distinctions already given, assessing
disclosure risks requires consideration of several aspects,
especially the following:
Properties of the data: structure of the data (relational data: one
row per individual or transactional data, for example, follow-
up time-to-event data), the data type (e.g., strings and nu-
merical values), scope of the data (e.g., clinical, survey, and
genomic data), number of attributes, and so on.
Type of user: for example, researcher, nonexperts, or ma-
chines.
Type of application: for example, not fixed or statistical
analyses like regression, classification, or clustering.
Type of access: open access or some type of restriction.
Modus of release: for example, release of a subset (hori-
zontal partition) or release of different kinds of charac-
teristics (vertical partition).
Attacker model: at least two kinds of attackers should be
discerned to assess the related disclosure risk. The first
one is the ‘‘prosecutor,’’ who targets one specific indi-
vidual, and the second is the ‘‘journalist,’’ who wants to
discredit the institution that is issuing the data and targets
any individual.
Basic Terms: Identifier, Quasi-Identifier,
and Sensitive Attribute
As a background for the terms examined here, a simpli-
fied example is given. A raw database of a hospital (Table 1)
consists of IDs, sex, year of birth, ZIP code, and the ICD-10
code. The hospital wants to release the database to enable
some statistical analyses for the general audience. Before
publishing, the data are transformed in such a manner that at
least two records have identical values for the so-called
quasi-identifiers (QIDs) (Table 2), and this kind of anon-
ymization is called k-anonymization.
The European data protection law does not provide a
classification of attributes related to anonymization, but only
refers to the whole set of attributes as either identifying
(personal data) or not (anonymized data). It protects ‘‘sen-
sitive’’ data by imposing higher constraints, but only so far,
as it is personal data.
Unique identifiers
An identifier is a unique identifier only if a single spec-
ified individual is associated with it. Examples are social
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security numbers and biometric identifiers, including fin-
gerprint, retinal and voiceprints, some genetic data, etc. The
ID in Table 1 is not a globally unique identifier, but only an
artificial identifier for the data set. In real-life settings, such
an identifier should be masked as well, because several re-
leases of an anonymized data set with an identical ID in-
crease the probability of reidentification (such a stable ID
across several data sets makes the data set a pseudonymized
data set, irrespective of other safeguards).
In contrast, biometric and genetic identifiers are inter-
esting for statistical analysis and can be highly sensitive.
In addition, they are not changeable or erasable as artificial
identifiers. Once attributed to the respective individual,
they will serve to disclose his or her identity forever. The
strongest biometric identifier seems to be the passport photo,
since it is ‘‘readable’’ for everyone and thus very easily
attributable, whereas a full genome alone is unlikely to be
meaningful without the support of technical devices.
Quasi-identifiers
QIDs are ‘‘variable values or combinations of variable
values within a dataset that are not structurally unique but
might be empirically unique and therefore in principle un-
iquely identify a population unit.’’18 QIDs should contain
attribute A if an attacker could potentially obtain A from
other external resources, if it is used for data analysis, and if
it has discriminatory value. Examples of QIDs are gender,
age, postal codes, race, ethnicity, etc.
QIDs are at the heart of all efforts to protect privacy. They
are the attributes that are mainly addressed by the phrase ‘‘to
determine, whether a person is identifiable, account should
be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either
by the controller or by any other person to identify the said
person.’’ Background knowledge and external data sources
related to the QIDs can increase the probability of re-
identification drastically. Names are also QIDs, even though
they are often called ‘‘direct’’ identifiers, because they are
not structurally unique; however, like unique identifiers they
are in most cases uninteresting for analyses and can be de-
leted in the data set.
Sensitive attributes
According to Article 8 of the Data Protection Directive,
special categories of personal data revealing racial or
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
beliefs, trade-union membership, and data concerning
health or sex life are subject to a higher level of protection.
These categories are described as ‘‘sensitive data.’’ The
special protection of these categories of personal data re-
flects the fundamental rights to nondiscrimination as per
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
It is a basic principle of a democratic and open society that
people should exclusively be judged and treated according
to their free behavior—and not by inherited or otherwise
unchangeable attributes or by their religious or political
convictions.
So, a sensitive attribute is a variable that contains per-
sonal information with a high impact on privacy, and for
which it is required that no attacker has knowledge from
other sources than from the data subject themselves. Ma-
chanavajjhala et al.26 state that ‘‘an attribute is marked
sensitive if an adversary must not be allowed to discover the
value of that attribute for any individual in the dataset.’’
Hence, the technical perspective seems to coincide with the
definition of the legal perspective. However, the definition
of sensitive attributes in the research community does fre-
quently not often refer to any specific law,10 but classifies
further attributes as sensitive in specific applications,
whereby it remains unclear on which basis this classification
is done (e.g., is salary a sensitive attribute?). The conse-
quence of defining an attribute as sensitive is that in addition
to the protection of identity disclosure by means of suffi-
ciently masking QIDs, measures have to be taken for pro-
tecting against attribute disclosure (e.g., in addition to k-
anonymity, l-diversity has to be achieved).





ICD-10 codeSex Year of birth Zip code
6 M 1980 10117 Q90.1
8 F 1966 10117 F31.1
1 M 1979 10118 F31.0
9 M 1988 11067 F31.9
11 F 1965 11910 G50.1
4 F 1983 11934 F34.8
10 M 1973 12002 F34.8
3 F 1967 12033 F31.9
2 M 1989 12200 F31.1
5 F 1959 12200 G50.1
12 M 1976 13011 Q90.1
7 M 1975 13135 Q90.0
ID is an irrelevant number for record identification. QIDs are sex,
year of birth, and zip code. The sensitive attribute is the ICD-10
code.
F, female; M, male; SensAttr, sensitive attribute; QIDs, quasi-
identifiers.









6 M 1970–1989 1011* Q90.1
8 F 1950–1969 10117 F31.1
1 M 1970–1989 1011* F31.0
9 M 1970–1989 11067 F31.9
11 F 1950–1969 1191* G50.1
4 F 1970–1989 1193* F34.8
10 M 1970–1989 12* F34.8
3 F 1950–1969 12* F31.9
2 M 1970–1989 12* F31.1
5 F 1950–1969 12* G50.1
12 M 1970–1989 13* Q90.1
7 M 1970–1989 13* Q90.0
Records 8 and 9 are suppressed because they would lead to a
coarsening of four other records in their zip code. For ‘‘year of
birth,’’ a full-domain generalization to ‘‘2-decade-range of birth’’ is
made, whereas local generalizations (or recodings) for the zip code
are made to achieve a two-anonymous data set with minimal
distortion.
*Indicates that digits were omitted.
370 SARIYAR AND SCHLÜNDER
Often, an implicit distinction between QIDs and sensitive
attributes is made that relates to the assumption of whether
external information on them is possible or not.21 If it is
assumed that no external information (i.e., information
outside the context of gathering/producing the data) is
available, then that attribute cannot be used for increasing
the disclosure probability, and hence can be published
without the necessity of distortion (if everything else is
anonymized appropriately). Because sensitive attributes are
frequently the main endpoints for statistical analyses, such a
nonperturbed sharing of sensitive attributes is highly desir-
able. However, whether an attacker can have external
knowledge about an attribute cannot be determined in ad-
vance, especially when parameters of the context are
changing. In most cases, therefore, sensitive attributes
should be considered as QIDs with special concerns re-
garding attribute disclosure risks, which, however, can have
severe detriment effects on the usefulness of the data, when
anonymization methods are applied.
Even if an attacker cannot point to a record as belonging
to one person, there could be the possibility to infer sen-
sitive information about one person. In Table 2, records
with ID 12 and 7 are indistinguishable with respect to
the QIDs and are different with respect to the ICD-10
code, which represents the sensitive attribute in this case.
However, an attacker can still infer that someone who
was treated in the hospital, was born in 1986, is male, and
lives in the 13000 zip code area must have the Down
syndrome.
What Is Identification?
While discussing disclosure risks in the preceding section,
the term ‘‘identification’’ has been used without proper
definition. It seems obvious what this term means, but closer
scrutiny reveals that the precise meaning of identification of
a person is far from being self-evident. The Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party states: ‘‘Identification is normally
achieved through particular pieces of information which we
may call ‘identifiers’ and which hold a particularly privi-
leged and close relationship with the particular individual.
Examples are outward signs of the appearance of this per-
son, like height, hair color, clothing, etc., or a quality of the
person which cannot be immediately perceived, like a pro-
fession, a function, a name, etc.’’27 The Directive mentions
those identifiers in the definition of personal data in Article
2 when it states that a natural person ‘‘can be identified,
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an iden-
tification number or to one or more factors specific to his
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity.’’
Does such a definition really help in understanding what
identification is? What does it mean that an identifier has
to be associated with an individual and data about him? In
philosophical debates, the ship of Theseus is an arche-
typical example of the questions: how many and what
kinds of changes are possible before losing the identity of
something? Before I can associate an identifier to an in-
dividual, I have to identify him, and this means: I have to
determine under which circumstances I would associate
the same identifier to an individual. Pondering about this
problem, the circularity of the definition already described
becomes manifest. I can only associate an identifier to an
individual if I already have identified him or her. To avoid
circularity, one solution consists in equating one unique
(and relative stable) identifier with the individual, for
example, the (genomic) fingerprint. Identification would
then mean to associate other identifiers (the question re-
mains: what kind of identifiers?) with the fingerprint. For
some unique identifiers, for example, the combination of
full name, date of birth, place of birth, and passport photo,
such an association seems unnecessary, but it is useful,
for example, because associating these attributes with
address details or fingerprints allows finding nonpresent
individuals who had undergone some changes in their
appearances.
Another question is related to the contexts of identifi-
cation. According to the Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party opinion on personal data, ‘‘a natural person
can be considered as ‘identified’ when, within a group of
persons, he or she is ‘distinguished’ from all other mem-
bers of the group.’’27 Hence, it is relevant to what kind of
groups one refers. When the group is limited or predefined
in the sense that not the whole world population is in-
cluded, one can speak of ‘‘relative identification.’’ In this
case, it is enough that the person is singled out (‘‘distin-
guished’’) within the group. If the group is the whole
world population, one can speak of ‘‘absolute identifica-
tion.’’ Such a global singling out allows, for example,
traceability, if the distinguishing features are found else-
where again. Our focus here is on the second type of
singling out.
We refrain from equating singling out with identifica-
tion. Of course, singling out is the basic requirement to
identify an individual, but is this sufficient? In that case,
every unique identifier would be enough to identify a
person. Knowing the full genome of an individual would
therefore be sufficient to identify him or her. However,
this seems to be at odds with the usual understanding as
well as with the legal perspective. Normally, no one as-
sumes that the knowledge of the full genome or a finger-
print as such reveals the identity of an individual. To know
somebody in ‘‘flesh and bones’’27 seems to require more
than the knowledge of a unique identifier. As already
stated (a solution to prevent circular definition of ‘‘iden-
tification’’), it is the associations of a unique identifier
with other personal information that should be considered
as ‘‘identification.’’
Information that serves to identify a person in everyday
life situations is contained in a personal ID card: the full
name, date of birth, place of birth, height, nationality, and
passport photo. None of these particular attributes can be
qualified as a unique identifier, even though a passport photo
is a strong identifier, which is nevertheless not wholly sta-
ble. These attributes must be available and understandable
to the ‘‘average individuals’’ (no attackers). The question is:
would someone who already knows the person by having
met him in ‘‘flesh and bones’’ be able to attribute the re-
spective information to him? When associating such infor-
mation with artificial unique identifiers, circularity of
identification seems to be unavoidable (how to be sure that
one is only pretending to be the one to whom the identifier
belongs?). Therefore, it is crucial to have a natural unique
identifier, to which such personal information is associated.
In conclusion, identification of an individual (based
on digital data) means to know a globally unique natural
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identifier (allowing a singling out), which can be a combi-
nation of attributes and to associate them with a set of at-
tributes. Both together allow a singling out and the
recognition of the individual. The genome and fingerprints
are unique identifiers, and they can stand for the individual,
but they are not sufficient to identify an individual without
further reference information. In general, there is no fixed
set of (reference) information that is always sufficient for
identification.
How Can Reidentification Be Prevented?
Anonymization methods for mitigating disclosure risks
can be classified into several different ways.10,12,13 In con-
trast to many unstructured listings and bipartitions such as
by LeFevre et al.,28 we propose the following tripartition:
(1) methods for hiding attribute details (e.g., generalization
and suppression),
(2) methods that disassociate attributes (e.g., anatomization
and disassociation), and
(3) methods that perturb the data (e.g., randomization and
permutation).
A review on anonymization methods that list them ac-
cording to the different disclosure risks is given by Gkoulalas-
Divanis et al.29 We opt here for a classification that is based
on the techniques underlying the methods, because we want
to give an orientation regarding the central ingredients for the
methods.
Hiding attribute details: generalization
and suppression
Fulfilling the k-anonymity criteria, which focuses on re-
ducing the reidentification risk, is the most targeted goal
within this group of methods.9 k-Anonymity requires that all
equivalence classes (an equivalence class is the list of all
records that have the same values for the QIDs) have at least
a size of k. In this case, the reidentification probability has an
upper bound of 1/k. When using generalization for categor-
ical variables, usually a domain hierarchy taxonomy must be
generated (for alternatives, see Ref.30). The most granular
level is at the bottom, and every higher hierarchy level
coarsens the data, for example, 45-year-olds (at the bottom) /
[50, 60] interval / [40, 70] interval, etc. Generalization is
then the replacement of attribute values with parent values
in the taxonomy. For continuous variables, microaggrega-
tion can be used, which is the aggregation (e.g., by ap-
plying the mean or median function) of the most similar
observations.
When only a few records or attributes increase the re-
identification risk significantly, it can be more efficient to
suppress cells or whole records instead of using general-
ization. In general, one can decide to make a full domain
or a local form of hiding details (recoding or generaliza-
tion). In the former case, all records are affected, whereas
in the latter case, a selection of records takes place, which
reduces the distortion on the data, but increases the com-
plexity of the anonymization process. Two methods that
try to achieve a better balance between utility and risk
by considering more than one attribute at a time are
multidimensional generalization31 and multidimensional
suppression.30
Disassociating attributes
The central aim of methods in this group is to disassociate
the relationship between QIDs and sensitive attributes. This
is mainly done by scattering sensitive attributes in sub-
records of the published data, which can guarantee the
preservation of the original sensitive attribute values in the
transformed data set, in contrast to generalization and sup-
pression. However, such a guarantee also has a detrimental
effect, because the original of the attribute values remain in the
data, which increases the risk of membership disclosure.
Names of the approaches for dissociating attributes are very
similar, for example, bucketization,32 anatomization,21,33 slic-
ing,24 and disassociation in a narrow sense.34 For example,
bucketization partitions the tuples into buckets of similar sen-
sitive attribute values and disassociates the sensitive attributes
from the QIDs by randomly permuting the sensitive values in
each bucket. All these methods pretend to have less utility loss
than generalization and suppression and to handle high-
dimensional data, for which the generalization and suppression
would produce useless data if k-anonymity is required.
Perturbation of the data
Pertubation refers to the transformation of original data
values.10 Concretely, perturbation is the distortion of the
data by adding noise (randomization), swapping values,
aggregating values (e.g., using the mean of a group), or
using synthetic data. This family of anonymization methods
produces transformed data that have similar statistical in-
formation as the original data. The perturbed data records do
not correspond to real-world entities, which makes attribute
disclosure rather improbable, but makes subanalyses rather
problematic because of the lack of truthfulness in the
transformed data. Especially for noise addition, it is im-
portant to have a proper randomization scheme. This means,
for example, that noise should have correlations; otherwise,
the correlation between the attributes is not masked and can
be used to infer some characteristics.35
Conclusion
The discussion of basic notions related to anonymization
showed that there is some work to do to achieve a mutual
understanding between legal and technical experts concerning
some of these notions. With respect to sensitive attributes that
are listed in texts of law, there is an agreement that they need
special protection. However, it depends on further assump-
tions regarding the availability of external information on
such sensitive attributes whether they are perturbed in the
anonymization process or not. In addition, there are attributes
that are deemed sensitive without being listed in a text of law.
This might be based on good reasons but having criteria for
classifying attributes as sensitive and making assumptions
explicit seems desirable, although we are aware of the fact
that the determination of such criteria can be very difficult,
especially for context-dependent sensitivity.
Regarding identification, lacking mutual understanding
can be ascribed to the problem of defining this term at all.
We have tried to circumvent a circular definition by con-
sidering two decisions: first, deciding which identifier
should stand for the individual and second, deciding how to
recognize the individual (by someone she has met before).
The first decision implies again some circularity, if the
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association between the individual and the unique identifier
is not based on natural identifiers such as the genome or the
fingerprints. Such natural unique identifiers can be matched
to the individual by taking samples from him or her. When
using artificial unique identifiers, circularity seems to be
unavoidable (how to be sure that one is only pretending to
be the one to whom the identifier belongs?).
Besides notational questions, we also touched on some
challenges with respect to anonymization techniques. The
anonymization of genetic data aggravates these challenges
because of the volume as well as the content of molecular
data. Pakstis et al.36 showed that a carefully chosen set of 45
single nucleotide polymorphisms is frequently sufficient to
provide entity matches with a type 1 error of 10-15. Erlich
and Narayanan provide several examples for breaching ge-
netic privacy.37 From our perspective, the major problem of
genetic data—besides the volume—stems from their inherent
double nature, containing both sensitive attributes and unique
identifiers (not only QIDs!). Enforcing k-anonymity for ge-
netic data (e.g., sequences) will often lead to useless data,
even if one uses state-of-the-art methods.38 On the other hand,
if an attacker can link an individual by using his or her ge-
nome, it would permit the adversary to learn many sensitive
details, such as phenotypes (e.g., skin color) and susceptibility
to diseases. Therefore, alternatives are necessary for providing
a sufficient balance between utility and privacy for high-
dimensional molecular data that are also relevant for other
settings, for example, fully homomorphic encryption, secure
multipart computation,39–41 as well as tight access policies.
It is useful to have some hints regarding anonymization
methods and techniques that are suitable for the specific
purpose. For example, Templ et al.42 suggest using gener-
alization and local suppression (hiding some details in at-
tributes) to achieve low disclosure risk when only a few
QIDs are in the data set. In other more complex cases,
methods that are more sophisticated should be applied. As
the WP29 group states: ‘‘anonymization should not be re-
garded as a one-off exercise, and the attending risks should
be reassessed regularly by data controllers. The state of the
art in methods and technology should be considered’’.43
Finally, using a dialectical definition process to merge
technical and legal perspectives on terms seems important
for enhancing mutual understanding. For example, the term
‘‘aggregated data’’ can have the connotation of ‘‘nonindi-
vidual,’’ even if it allows identification of individuals. As this
term is not used in the EU Data Protection Directive, it is
crucial to define clearly—together with experts from differ-
ent fields—what ‘‘aggregated data’’ mean. From a technical
perspective, privacy-preserving data mining experts could
make a very useful contribution to this, because they are
addressing the problem of preventing identity disclosure on
‘‘aggregated’’ query results. A technical definition can then
be the start point of a concerted definition process.
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